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ACSC Threat Report 2025-26: State-Sponsored Actors

24 Oct 2026 · Updated 24 Oct 2026

The 2025-26 report describes state-sponsored actors targeting Australian governments, businesses and critical infrastructure for espionage and strategic advantage, and increasingly pre-positioning within networks to disrupt essential services during a crisis or conflict. ASD’s blunt framing is that cyber is now normalised as a feature of conventional warfare.

What are state-sponsored actors doing?

Stealing information and quietly preparing for disruption. The report says state-sponsored cyber actors continued to target Australian organisations primarily to gain access to sensitive or non-public information, and that this activity extends well beyond government networks to critical infrastructure, private businesses and individuals. Increasingly, as the global security environment deteriorates, these actors seek to pre-position within networks to enable future intelligence collection, disruption, or access to higher-value targets at a time of their choosing. This is a shift from pure espionage toward holding access as a strategic option, and it is the backdrop to the report overview. These actors often behave like an advanced persistent threat.

What does “pre-positioning” mean in practice?

Getting in quietly and staying hidden, to act later. Pre-positioning is the practice of gaining covert, persistent access to a network and maintaining it without triggering a response, so the actor can collect intelligence over time or disrupt services when it suits them, often during a crisis or conflict. It is patient and deliberate, and it is why detection and visibility matter so much: an actor who is already inside will not announce themselves. This connects to techniques like lateral movement, where an intruder expands access quietly across an environment. For defenders, the implication is that preventing initial access is not enough; you also need the logging and monitoring to find an actor who is already present.

How does cyber fit into conflict now?

As a normal part of it. The report states plainly that recent global conflicts have shown cyber capabilities being regularly integrated by state-sponsored actors, and those aligned with their cause, to support military objectives, disrupt critical systems and influence the strategic environment, and that cyber is now normalised as a feature of conventional warfare. For Australia, that means state-actor cyber activity is not a distant geopolitical abstraction; it reaches local critical infrastructure and businesses in the supply chains that support essential services. The line between espionage, sabotage and cybercrime is increasingly blurred, which makes attribution and response harder.

Who is actually being targeted?

Across the economy, not just Canberra. The report is clear that state-actor activity extends beyond government to critical infrastructure entities, private businesses and individuals. During the year ASD published advisories on state-linked activity, including countering Chinese state-sponsored actors compromising networks worldwide for espionage, defending against China-nexus covert networks of compromised devices, and pro-Russia hacktivists conducting opportunistic attacks against critical infrastructure. Private businesses matter here because they are often the softer route into a harder target through the supply chain. A small supplier with weak security can be the path to a larger, better-defended organisation.

What should organisations do about state-actor threats?

Raise the cost of access and improve the odds of detection. There is no single control for a capable state actor, but the report’s priorities make a determined intruder’s job harder: reduce legacy IT, which shrinks the attack surface; implement event logging, so a quiet intruder can be found; manage supply chain risk; and prepare for post-quantum cryptography, so encrypted data stays protected as computing advances. The ASD Essentials and its visibility and response capability domain are built for exactly this. For government suppliers and critical infrastructure, an IRAP assessment against the ISM is often part of the picture. Cybernion helps organisations build this resilience through its virtual CISO and Essential Eight and ASD frameworks services.

Frequently asked questions

What do state-sponsored actors want?

Primarily access to sensitive or non-public information for espionage and strategic advantage, and increasingly covert, persistent access to enable future disruption of essential services.

What is “pre-positioning”?

Gaining and quietly holding access within a network so an actor can collect intelligence, move to higher-value targets, or disrupt services at a time of their choosing, often during a crisis or conflict.

Who is targeted?

Not just government. State actors target government networks, critical infrastructure, private businesses and individuals, and activity extends across the economy.


Written by Gaurav Vikash, an ASD endorsed IRAP assessor and senior cyber security leader with 18 years of experience across Australia, the UK and Asia, including CISO and senior security leadership roles. He holds CISSP, CISA, CISM and CRISC and is an ISO 27001 Lead Auditor and ISO 42001 Lead Implementer, and speaks regularly at industry conferences.

If state-actor risk is on your radar, talk to us.

Sources:

  1. Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Australian cyber threat landscape, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
  2. Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Executive summary, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
  3. Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Year in Review, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026

Last updated: 24 October, 2026

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