Threat Intelligence
ACSC Threat Report 2025-26: Critical Infrastructure
25 Oct 2026 · Updated 25 Oct 2026
The 2025-26 report treats critical infrastructure as a priority target. State-sponsored actors are increasingly pre-positioning within networks to disrupt essential services during a crisis or conflict, and CI entities face espionage. ASD supported operators directly, completing 6 CI uplifts and 12 CI uplift sprints and reaching 258 representatives from 157 CI organisations.
Why is critical infrastructure a focus of the report?
Because it is where state-actor pre-positioning and essential-service disruption meet. The report describes state-sponsored actors targeting Australian governments, businesses and critical infrastructure (CI) for espionage and strategic advantage, with some motivated to maintain covert access so they can disrupt essential services during a period of crisis or conflict. ASD’s broader observation that cyber is now normalised as a feature of conventional warfare lands hardest on CI, because the consequence of compromise can be loss of an essential service to the public. This is why CI ranks alongside government as a primary concern in the report overview and in state-sponsored actors.
What did ASD do to support critical infrastructure?
It ran a dedicated CI uplift program and OT exchanges. According to the report, ASD’s Critical Infrastructure Uplift Program completed 6 CI uplifts and 12 CI uplift sprints, held 10 technical cyber security workshops with CI operators, and reached 258 representatives from 157 CI organisations through Operational Technology Information Exchanges. ASD also published CI-focused guidance during the year, including CI Fortify advice on isolating essential systems, and issued advisories on threats to CI such as pro-Russia hacktivist activity against global critical infrastructure. The direction is practical help with the specific problem CI faces: protecting operational technology that cannot simply be patched or rebooted like enterprise IT.
How does this connect to operational technology?
OT is the hard part of CI security, and now has its own guidance. Much critical infrastructure runs on operational technology: industrial control systems and cyber-physical equipment with long lifecycles, safety constraints and legacy protocols. The new ASD Essentials includes a dedicated OT chapter for exactly this environment, and ASD published OT-specific guidance through the year on secure architecture, secure connectivity and integrating AI into OT safely. For operators, the message is that OT security is distinct from enterprise IT security and needs its own approach, not a copy of office IT controls.
What are the obligations behind this?
Many CI operators are captured by the SOCI Act and must run a risk program. Australia’s Security of Critical Infrastructure (SOCI) Act imposes obligations on responsible entities across defined critical infrastructure sectors, including, for many, a Critical Infrastructure Risk Management Program (CIRMP). The threat report is the backdrop to those obligations: it is the evidence of why they exist. Operators unsure of their status should start with are you a responsible entity under SOCI. Meeting the obligation is not the same as being secure, but it is the floor.
What should critical infrastructure operators do now?
Act on the enduring priorities, and treat OT on its own terms. The report’s priorities apply squarely to CI: reduce legacy IT exposed to the internet, implement event logging and visibility, manage supply chain risk, and prepare for post-quantum cryptography. On top of that, CI operators should adopt the ASD Essentials chapters relevant to their environment, including the OT chapter, and build the assurance that both the Essentials and a CIRMP expect. Cybernion helps CI operators and their suppliers through its Essential Eight and ASD frameworks and IRAP assessment services.
Frequently asked questions
What is the main critical infrastructure concern in the 2025-26 report?
State-sponsored actors pre-positioning within networks to enable disruption of essential services during a crisis or conflict, alongside espionage targeting of CI entities.
What did ASD do to help critical infrastructure?
Among other work, ASD completed 6 CI uplifts and 12 CI uplift sprints, ran 10 technical workshops, and reached 258 representatives from 157 CI organisations through Operational Technology Information Exchanges.
What should critical infrastructure operators do?
Reduce legacy IT, improve logging and visibility, secure OT, and adopt the ASD Essentials, while meeting their obligations under the SOCI Act and a CIRMP where required.
Written by Gaurav Vikash, an ASD endorsed IRAP assessor and senior cyber security leader with 18 years of experience across Australia, the UK and Asia, including CISO and senior security leadership roles. He holds CISSP, CISA, CISM and CRISC and is an ISO 27001 Lead Auditor and ISO 42001 Lead Implementer, and speaks regularly at industry conferences.
If you operate critical infrastructure and want help, talk to us.
Sources:
- Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Year in Review, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
- Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Australian cyber threat landscape, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
- Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Executive summary, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
Last updated: 25 October, 2026
