Threat Intelligence
ACSC Threat Report 2025-26: Ransomware
25 Oct 2026 · Updated 25 Oct 2026
ASD responded to 139 ransomware incidents in FY2025-26, consistent with the previous year, and its analysis shows “data encryption for impact” was a strong contributor to the more serious compromises. Ransomware crews increasingly steal data as well as encrypt it, to sell or extort, which keeps it among the most damaging threats to Australian organisations.
How much ransomware did the report record?
Steady in number, but heavy in impact. ASD’s ACSC responded to 139 ransomware incidents in FY2025-26, consistent with the previous year. The flat count understates the harm: ASD’s analysis of attacker techniques found that “data encryption for impact” was a strong contributor to incidents categorised C3 or higher, the more serious end of its scale. In other words, when an incident was severe, ransomware was often involved. This fits the wider picture in the report overview and key statistics, where extensive compromises rose from 26 to 40 year on year. For the fundamentals, see what is ransomware.
How are ransomware attacks changing?
Theft and extortion increasingly accompany encryption. The report describes cybercriminals prepared to sell data online or disrupt services to force payment, and notes that Australians had personal information compromised in global data breaches that was then held to ransom, sold or published. This is the double-extortion pattern: attackers exfiltrate data before encrypting it, so even an organisation with good backups faces the threat of its data being leaked. ASD also published an advisory during the year on the INC Ransom affiliate model targeting critical networks, the first ASD joint advisory co-sealed with a Pacific Island nation. The affiliate model keeps ransomware accessible to a wide pool of criminals.
How does ransomware get in?
Through the same weaknesses as most attacks: credentials, phishing and unpatched systems. The report is clear that compromised accounts and credentials were among the most frequently reported incident categories, and that social engineering, sharpened by AI, remains a common route in. Unpatched vulnerabilities are another reliable path, with ASD recording exploitation of a flaw dating to 2008. None of this is exotic: ransomware usually enters through a weak password without multi-factor authentication, a convincing phishing message, or a server that was never patched. That is why the basics in the ASD Essentials do most of the work in preventing it.
Should an organisation pay?
ASD advises against it, and reporting obligations apply. Paying a ransom does not guarantee data recovery, may not stop a leak, and funds further criminal activity, which is why ASD consistently advises against payment. Australia also has ransomware payment reporting obligations for many entities, so a payment is not a private decision. The better position is to be ready not to pay: tested, offline backups, a rehearsed incident response plan, and the preventive controls that stop most intrusions. Preparation, not payment, is the resilient answer.
What should organisations do about ransomware?
Prevent, prepare, and practise. Prevention is the Essential Eight and ASD Essentials basics: patch quickly, enforce MFA or passkeys, restrict administrative privileges, and keep tested backups that are offline or otherwise protected from an attacker who gets domain access. Preparation is an incident response plan that assumes data theft as well as encryption. Practice is rehearsing that plan through a tabletop exercise before an incident, not during one. Cybernion helps organisations build this resilience through its Essential Eight and ASD frameworks and virtual CISO services.
Frequently asked questions
How many ransomware incidents did ASD respond to?
139 ransomware incidents in FY2025-26, consistent with the previous year. ASD’s analysis shows data encryption for impact was a strong contributor to the more serious incidents.
Is ransomware getting worse?
The number held steady, but ransomware remains a strong contributor to higher-severity incidents, and attackers increasingly steal data as well as encrypt it, to sell or extort.
Should we pay a ransom?
ASD advises against paying, as it does not guarantee recovery and funds further crime. Australia also has ransomware payment reporting obligations for many entities.
Written by Gaurav Vikash, an ASD endorsed IRAP assessor and senior cyber security leader with 18 years of experience across Australia, the UK and Asia, including CISO and senior security leadership roles. He holds CISSP, CISA, CISM and CRISC and is an ISO 27001 Lead Auditor and ISO 42001 Lead Implementer, and speaks regularly at industry conferences.
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Sources:
- Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Year in Review, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
- Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, Australian cyber threat landscape, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
- Annual Cyber Threat Report 2025-26, cyber.gov.au, 26 October 2026
Last updated: 25 October, 2026
