An MFA fatigue attack sends a flood of authentication push notifications to a user who already has their credentials compromised, hoping they approve one out of confusion, accident or frustration. It bypasses push-based MFA without any technical exploit, using social engineering alone. The Essential Eight requires phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2/passkeys) from Maturity Level 2 upward, which closes off this attack class entirely. For organisations still on push-based MFA, number matching is the most practical immediate mitigation.
Multi-factor authentication is one of the most important security controls available. But one type of MFA, push notification-based, has a specific weakness that attackers have learned to exploit at scale.
How MFA fatigue attacks work
The attack starts with a valid set of credentials. The attacker has obtained the target’s username and password through phishing, a prior data breach, credential stuffing, or another method. These credentials are correct but not sufficient: the account is protected by MFA, so the attacker cannot complete authentication without the second factor.
With push-based MFA, the second factor is an approval from a notification sent to the user’s enrolled device. When the attacker enters the credentials, the MFA system sends a push notification to the legitimate user’s device asking whether they are trying to log in. If the user approves, authentication succeeds.
The attacker sends authentication requests repeatedly, triggering a stream of push notifications on the target’s phone or device. Dozens or hundreds of push notifications may arrive over minutes or hours.
The goal is to cause the user to:
- Accidentally approve one while trying to dismiss them
- Approve one out of frustration to stop the notifications
- Approve one after the attacker contacts them pretending to be IT support, explaining that a system issue is causing the notifications and they need to approve to clear the queue
That last step, contacting the target posing as IT support while the push flood is in progress, is a common refinement that significantly increases success rates. The user is confused and receiving what appears to be a system issue; an apparently helpful IT person explains what to do.
Why push MFA is vulnerable
Push-based MFA has a user experience advantage: it is easy to use. A single tap to approve or deny is faster than typing a six-digit TOTP code. But that simplicity is the vulnerability. The user is asked only to approve or deny a notification, without being required to verify that the notification corresponds to something they actually did. If the notification arrives at a moment of distraction, or is one of many arriving rapidly, the connection between the approval and a specific login attempt can break down.
The attack requires no technical exploit. It works entirely within the normal operation of the MFA system, using a legitimate authentication flow. That is why it is difficult to detect by purely technical means.
The Australian context: Essential Eight maturity levels
The Essential Eight addresses MFA at multiple maturity levels.
At Maturity Level 1, MFA is required for remote access, privileged users and important data repositories, and simpler forms such as SMS codes, one-time passwords or basic push approval are still acceptable.
At Maturity Level 2 and Maturity Level 3, the requirement steps up to phishing-resistant MFA, which the ASD defines as authentication that cryptographically binds the approval to the specific site and session being authenticated, preventing both real-time phishing and MFA fatigue attacks. This is implemented through FIDO2-compliant hardware security keys, passkeys, or platform authenticators such as Windows Hello for Business, rather than SMS codes, TOTP codes or simple push approval. An attacker cannot satisfy a FIDO2 authentication request remotely or through social engineering; it requires physical possession of the hardware key or the registered device with a biometric or PIN.
Organisations targeting Maturity Level 2 or above need to move to phishing-resistant MFA for the relevant accounts. This closes off the MFA fatigue attack class entirely for those accounts.
Practical mitigations if phishing-resistant MFA is not yet deployed
Not every organisation can immediately move to FIDO2. Interim mitigations that reduce the risk from MFA fatigue include:
Number matching. The user is required to enter a number displayed on the login screen into the authenticator app to approve. This prevents blind approval: the user must be looking at the login screen they are approving, which means they must actually be in the process of logging in. Number matching is now the default in Microsoft Authenticator and is available in several other MFA platforms. It significantly reduces the success rate of fatigue attacks.
Notification limits. Configuring the MFA system to limit the number of push notifications sent for a single authentication attempt and to lock the account after a threshold is exceeded reduces the window of opportunity and creates a detection signal.
User and security team alerts. When an unusual number of MFA push notifications is generated for an account in a short period, the user and the security operations team should be alerted. The user can be told to deny all requests and call IT support; the security team can investigate.
Security awareness training. Users should understand that a flood of unexpected MFA notifications is a sign of attack, not a technical glitch. They should know to deny all notifications and immediately contact IT security rather than approving one to make it stop. Training should cover the specific scenario where someone calls posing as IT support during the flood.
Conditional access policies. Policies that require a trusted device, a known network, or additional verification for logins from unusual locations can add friction for attackers who have a valid credential set but are not operating from an expected environment.
Relationship to other authentication attacks
MFA fatigue belongs to a broader class of authentication attacks that bypass MFA without breaking the cryptographic mechanism. Real-time phishing attacks capture TOTP codes as they are entered by proxying the user through a fake login page. Adversary-in-the-middle attacks intercept session tokens after a successful MFA authentication. SIM swapping redirects SMS codes to the attacker’s device.
Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2) defends against all of these because the authentication is cryptographically bound to the origin domain: a FIDO2 response that the user generates on the real site cannot be replayed or redirected to authenticate on a different site or at a different time.
Cybernion’s GRC and security advisory services include MFA strategy review and Essential Eight maturity assessments covering authentication requirements at all maturity levels.
Frequently asked questions
What is an MFA fatigue attack?
An MFA fatigue attack, also called MFA bombing or MFA push spam, is a social engineering attack in which an attacker who already has a user’s valid credentials sends a large number of multi-factor authentication push notifications to the user’s enrolled device. The goal is to overwhelm the user, who may approve a push notification by accident, out of confusion, to stop the interruptions, or after the attacker contacts them posing as IT support and says they need to approve the notification. Once approved, the attacker has the second factor they need to complete authentication.
What conditions make MFA fatigue attacks possible?
Three conditions are required. The attacker must already know the target’s username and password, typically obtained through phishing, a prior breach, or credential stuffing. The target’s account must be protected by push-based MFA rather than phishing-resistant MFA. And the MFA system must allow an unlimited or large number of push notifications without triggering a lockout or alerting the user that something unusual is happening. Attackers often contact the target simultaneously via phone or email posing as IT support to explain the notifications and pressure the user to approve.
How does MFA fatigue differ from phishing?
Both are social engineering attacks, but they operate at different points in the authentication flow. A phishing attack typically tries to capture credentials, MFA codes or session tokens by directing the user to a fake login page. An MFA fatigue attack occurs after the attacker already has the credentials and is attempting to satisfy the second factor. The target in a fatigue attack is not asked to enter anything; they are asked only to approve a push notification that arrives on their own device, which feels less suspicious than entering credentials into an unknown site.
What MFA types are vulnerable to fatigue attacks?
Push-based MFA is the primary target. This is the type of MFA that sends a notification to an authenticator app or registered device asking the user to approve or deny a login attempt. SMS-based one-time passwords are not vulnerable to MFA fatigue in the same way but are vulnerable to SIM swapping and interception. Time-based one-time passwords (TOTP) from an authenticator app are not vulnerable to push fatigue but are vulnerable to real-time phishing where the attacker requests the code. Phishing-resistant MFA, specifically FIDO2 with hardware security keys or passkeys, is not vulnerable to MFA fatigue because the authentication is cryptographically bound to the website the user is actually on.
How can organisations protect against MFA fatigue?
The most effective protection is deploying phishing-resistant MFA, specifically FIDO2-compliant hardware security keys or passkeys, which cannot be socially engineered because approval is cryptographically bound to the legitimate origin. For organisations that cannot immediately move to phishing-resistant MFA, number matching is a significant mitigation, where the user is required to enter a number displayed on the login screen into the authenticator app, preventing blind approval. Limiting the number of push notifications that can be sent within a period and alerting users and the security team when a threshold is reached reduces the attack window. Security awareness training helps users recognise and report an unusual flood of MFA requests.
Sources:
- Essential Eight Maturity Model, Australian Signals Directorate, 2026
- Implementing phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, Australian Signals Directorate, 2026
Last updated: 30 August, 2026
